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International Civil Religion: Respecting
Religious Diversity While Promoting
International Cooperation
By AMOS PROSSER DAVIS*
I. Introduction
Our global society needs a grounding to justify our "ought
statements." International civil religion is valuable because it
provides that grounding. It allows a plurality of traditional religious
adherents to cooperate when addressing moral issues that exist in the
haze between the sacred and the profane. Conversations across
boundaries - political, cultural, or religious - have become an
inescapable reality of the modern world. These boundaries are often
deeply entrenched and violently defended. The question then
becomes, "How can we broker agreement on morally-charged issues
if we approach those issues from different religious viewpoints?" In a
world where religious diversity abounds, we must seek to define the
parameters of a global morality that can be maintained without a
global religion.! International civil religion, as discerned in the U.N.
human rights documents, provides those parameters.
Reasonable people disagree both on their individual religious
viewpoints and on the degree those viewpoints should influence their
respective societies' politics and diplomatic relations.2 International
civil religion allows individuals to maintain their reasonable religious
Davis currently serves as a law clerk to the Honorable Kenneth M. Hoyt of
the Southern District of Texas. He has received a juris doctor degree and a master of
theological studies degree from Emory University. He is grateful to Professor John
Witte, Jr. for his wisdom and editorial suggestions.
1. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 222 (1996).
2. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36 (1993) ("The diversity of reasonable
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern
democratic societies ... is a permanent feature of the public culture.").
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viewpoints while existing in a diverse community because civil
religion venerates individual traditional values while championing no
single traditional religion. It distills the overlapping attributes of
most traditional religions, permitting traditional religious adherents
to continue practicing their faiths while living in community with
others whose faiths differ. It provides the international public
theologian a lens through which to view diplomatic endeavors and a
moral grounding with which to justify those endeavors.
These diplomatic endeavors concerning moral issues are
inevitable. The question is not whether nations will interact with each
other. The question rather is how nations will interact with each
other.3 In an era of interconnected societies, traditional religious
motivations cannot effectively drive political discourse, because the
conversants do not all share the same motivations. This creates a
disconnect which international civil religion can bridge.
And we need such a bridge. The lattice of bilateral and
multilateral treaties, trade agreements, military settlements, and
aspirational pledges that bind nations are insufficient to resolve
religious and moral disputes without a common ground to offer those
agreements a root structure. For many, religious convictions trump
countervailing values.! These sundry pacts and pledges between
nations require some common moral foundation upon which - or
some metaphorical table across which - state actors can negotiate.
Traditional religion' and modern diplomacy may seem
3. "The world is getting more crowded: in the next half a century the population
of our foraging species will approach nine billion. Depending on the circumstances,
conversations across boundaries can be delightful, or vexing: what they mainly are,
though, is inevitable." KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A
WORLD OF STRANGERS, at xxi (2006).
4. As noted by John Witte, Jr., "There are three things that people will die for -
their faith, their freedom, and their family." JOHN WITTE JR., GOD'S JOUST, GOD'S
JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION, at xi (2006).
5. Throughout this paper, "religion" is distinct from "civil religion." "Religion,"
or "traditional religion," means "theistic views of the universe and codes of behavior,
as well as atheistic, agnostic, rationalistic, and other convictions where both elements
are not contained." Natan Lerner, Religious Human Rights Under the United
Nations, in 2 RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 79, 82 (Johan D. van der Vyer & John Witte, Jr., eds., 1996). Lerner
goes on to note that the U.N. has refrained from positing a definition of religion to
avoid the controversy of proffering any black letter definition. Id. at 131.
6. Throughout this paper, I use derivations of "politics" and "diplomacy"
interchangeably out of convenience. However, strictly speaking, the interaction
between individuals within a society concerning governance is politics, whereas the
88 [Vol. 34:1
International Civil Religion
analogous to water and oil - simply unable to mix. And yet,
diplomats of a majority of countries are presently continuing to distill,
disseminate, and discharge an ever-larger umbrella of rights and
protections due to all individuals because human beings are just that,
human beings. Today, religious pluralism and tolerance prevail in
most developed societies, and religious explanations are often
insufficient justifications for political and diplomatic decisions.
Where traditional religion once provided a foundation to justify the
values embedded in human rights norms (even if those norms were
not referred to as such), a void exists today that needs to be filled.
In the absence of universal agreement on a traditional religion,
civil religion can foster cooperation among people of diverse religions
and worldviews. Religiously diverse peoples, even those with deeply
fixed traditional religious beliefs, can cooperate harmoniously with
respect to moral issues; those peoples need not agree on the
metaphysical reasons for why they share those particular morals.
Increasingly, the ties that bind humanity together as a world
population are legal ones.7 Since World War II, international
organizations like the U.N. have exerted inordinate amounts of time
and resources drafting a cornucopia of human rights covenants and
conventions, with each document positing universal thresholds of
acceptable human behavior.' These U.N. documents attempt to
identify common ground upon which nations of the modern world can
stand as they venture into the future as a global community. Over
time some of these behaviors have evolved into jus cogens norms,
interaction between societies concerning governance is diplomacy.
7. "Law . . . is not simply a set of rules and regulations that guide our behavior
from time to time. It is far more central to our lives: the legal system embodies our
last remaining vestige of a sense of 'community' - of shared values and expectations.
All the other dimensions of our lives - race, religion, education, the arts, regional
loyalty, and so on - divide us as much as they join us together because they are based
on matters of 'substance' on which we so often disagree . . .. The traditions, heritage,
and perspectives of Americans are now so disparate and isolated within ever smaller
subcommunities that no common purpose, direction, or moral values connect us
fundamentally . . . except our system of law. Not any particular law, of course, but
the system as a whole that embodies the 'rule of law' in our society." Timothy P.
Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking Professionalism, 41 EMORY L.J. 403, 422
(1992).
8. See, e.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 992 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
ICESCR]. Other such organizations include the Arab League, the Organization of
American States, the European Union, and the Organization for African Union.
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such that they are binding even on nations that have not ratified any
U.N. convention concerning those behaviors.! These norms are
among the tenets or scriptures of international civil religion. As jus
cogens norms continue to be distilled and disseminated, the consensus
on moral issues will continue to grow. To the extent that a citizen
deviates from these evolving scriptures, censure can be rendered, with
the international community appealing to these scriptures for
justification. With the aid of international civil religion, as expressed
through its scriptures, we need not strive for a traditional religio-
political amalgamation that is no longer within the grasp of the global
community.
This paper consists of five segments: (I) this introduction; (II) a
brief summary of a few key scholars who laid the foundations upon
which the concept of international civil religion is built; (III) an
overview of a few key U.N. documents that further the aspirations of
international civil religion; (IV) a proposed public theology; and (V)
concluding reflections.
II. Key Scholars
From at least the time of Aristotle, a distinction has been drawn
between written laws and the unspoken principles that are supposed
to undergird those written laws."o Moral theorists from Aristotle to
Appiah have written about these unspoken under-girding moral
principles. The father of international law, Hugo Grotius, was also a
natural law theorist, thus manifesting his belief that some moral
absolutes exist which permeate and transcend positive law." Since
Grotius' time, numerous scholars have attested to the same idea.
Several of the more prominent civil religion scholars are Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Alexis de Tocqueville, Robert Bellah, Martin
Marty, and Harold Berman. Each scholar made significant efforts to
identify these unspoken and transcendent moral principles. Rousseau
popularized the term "civil religion" and sparked a dialogue about
civil religion that continues to the present day. Tocqueville
documented how civil religion somewhat inadvertently developed in
9. Jus cogens norms include the prohibition of torture and genocide. See DAVID
J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 192 (Foundation Press ed., 2001).
10. ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1325, 1359
(Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
11. See, e.g., HUGO GROTIus, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (Richard Tuck
ed., Jean Barbeyrac trans., Liberty Fund 2005) (1625).
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American society once government refrained from excessive
intervention in traditional religious affairs. Bellah built on
Tocqueville's observations, defining the parameters of civil religion in
the American context. Marty participated in the civil religion
conversation by explaining public theologies - individual
understandings and contributions to a communal civil religion. And
Berman transitioned the conversation from a theoretical discussion to
a legal discussion, thereby setting the stage for an understanding of
civil religion's role in public international legislation. These scholars,
individually and collectively, crafted a theory of civil religion that
informs and supports the human rights regime of public international
law, as manifest in the U.N. human rights documents, which will be
considered infra in Section 111.12
A. Jean-Jacques Rousseau
Rousseau brought the concept of civil religion to the forefront of
scholarly debate. He was born in Geneva in 1712 and was raised by
his father after his mother died in childbirth.13 He was a French
Enlightenment philosopher, struggling to reconcile his deist notions
of morality with his Calvinist heritage and Catholic education.14
Sometimes labeled a subversive for writing against the political
mainstream of his day," Rousseau dedicated a good portion of his
scholarship to describing the "virtuous citizen" - one with a
compelling answer to the question, "Why, and whom, should I
obey?"16 Like many deist Enlightenment scholars he was raised in a
religious environment and he questioned how to invigorate moral
action without invoking traditional religion." In addressing this
query, Rousseau popularized the term (that we translate as) "civil
religion" in 1762.
He discerned the inevitable link between religious and political
12. See infra Section III.
13. JEAN-JAQUES ROUSSEAU, THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS: ON THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT ix (Donald A. Cress trans. and ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1987) (1778).
14. Id. at ix-xii.
15. Id. at xi.
16. Id. at xv.
17. Id. at xvi.
18. Id. at 226. Benjamin Franklin had used the terms "public religion" and "civil
religion" as early as 1749; see BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE
EDUCATION OF YOUTH IN PENNSYLVANIA 22 (1749), where Franklin speaks of a
"Publick Religion."
2011] 91
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
intolerance, 9 highlighting the difference between one's individually
held beliefs and those beliefs endorsed by that individual's
community.20 While individual beliefs can be beneficial, politically
established or socially mandated beliefs lead to exclusivity,
intolerance, and tyranny.21 He averred that societal endorsement of
civil intolerance is entirely "contrary to the social spirit,"22 because
"[w]hatever breaks up social unity is worthless." 23
Expressing a preference for the separation of Church and State
that was to become a dominant theme in Western notions of good
government, he advocated religious pluralism to the extent that such
pluralism does not interfere with one's civic duties.24 Opting for a
civil religion in lieu of a governmentally endorsed traditional religion,
Rousseau proffered a skeletal framework upon which numerous
traditional religious viewpoints could gain purchase. 25  The only
negative dogma that he insisted upon was the exclusion of religious
intolerance. 26  After all, "[w]henever theological intolerance is
allowed, it is impossible for it not to have some civil effect; and once it
does, the sovereign no longer is sovereign, not even over temporal
affairs."27  Thus, because a national religion had become - even
during Rousseau's time - harder to enforce and maintain,28 "tolerance
should be shown to all those that tolerate others, so long as their
19. ROUSSEAU, supra note 13, at 220. ("[Tjheological and civil intolerance... are
by nature the same.").
20. Id. at 221.
21. Id. at 224.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 223.
24. Id. at 226 ("Each man can have in addition such opinions as he pleases,
without it being any of the sovereign's business to know what they are. For since the
other world is outside the province of the sovereign, whatever the fate of subjects in
the life to come, it is none of its business, so long as they are good citizens in this
life.").
25. Id. ("The dogmas of civil religion ought to be simple, few in number,
precisely worded, without explanations or commentaries. The existence of a
powerful, intelligent, beneficent divinity that foresees and provides; the life to come;
the happiness of the just; the punishment of the wicked; the sanctity of the social
contract and of laws.").
26. Id. ("Those who distinguish between civil and theological intolerance are
mistaken . . . Those two types of intolerance are inseparable. It is impossible to live
in peace with those one believes to be damned.").
27. Id. at 227 (citation omitted).




dogmas contain nothing contrary to the duties of a citizen."29
Religious tolerance was central to Rousseau's notion of civil
religion. In both On the Social Contract and Emile, Rousseau's
premise is based upon his understanding that "immoral society of his
day was making immoral men, incapable of reforming a culture in
whose corruption they could not help but connive."" For Rousseau's
biographer, "[t]he one way to break this impasse was to create a new
man who could . . . create a new society.""1 For Rousseau, the central
question was what authority an individual should obey, particularly in
a fractured society rife with contrasting viewpoints.32 After Rousseau
began the conversation about civil religion, Tocqueville showed how
civil religion developed as a byproduct of a truly democratic society
that allowed for religious diversity. Addressing the American
experiment, Tocqueville documented how the United States
attempted to create precisely such a new society.
B. Alexis de Tocqueville
In his commentary on the American experiment, Alexis de
Tocqueville set the stage for much of the subsequent scholarly study
of civil religion. He is a scholar upon whom Robert Bellah relies,"
and Tocqueville offered a fresh French perspective about how civil
religion developed in America. After traveling to the U.S. in the
1830s, he wrote Democracy in America, a two-volume commentary on
the American experiment.34 In these volumes, he critiqued the
American system of government, the American citizenry, and the
American persona. Tocqueville was fascinated by his trip to
America, and he sought to understand how a nation, originally settled
as a cluster of colonies settled by many people seeking religious
29. Id.
30. Peter Gay, Introduction to ROUSSEAU, supra note 13, at xiv.
31. Id.
32. This is not to say that Rousseau would have approved of the Jacobin's
subsequent uses of his theory as partial justification for their behavior during the
French Revolution. Their anti-religious intolerance at times matched and even
surpassed the religious intolerance of some of their contemporaries. Some scholars
maintain that the Jacobin movement used Rousseau to improve their image, using his
name to lend their cause legitimacy while not adhering to the substance of his
theories. See, e.g., Crane Brinton, Political Ideas in the Jacobin Clubs 43 (2) POL. SC.
Q. 250-52 (1928).
33. See discussion infra Section II.C.
34. JAMES T. SCHLEIFER, THE MAKING OF TOCQUEVILLE'S DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA, at xv (Liberty Fund, 2nd ed. 1980).
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freedom, could still agree on the moral foundations of government.
In other words, how could a country that is "eminently democratic"
agree upon preferred modes of conduct when it need not agree upon
the underlying religious motivations for those modes of conduct?"
He averred that to achieve political equality, "rights must be
given to every citizen."" That basic premise being established, the
question then becomes which rights to include that bear upon the
"public morality."3  He noted that it is necessary though not easy to
teach people to exercise political rights. "Do you not see that
religious belief is shaken and the divine notion of right is declining,
that morality is debased and the notion of moral right is fading
away?"" He averred that, despite the democratic nature of the U.S.,
there are certain "customs," "mores," or "habits of the heart" that
influence the American populace.39 Among these habits is religion, in
particular a religion that is "a political institution which powerfully
contributes to the maintenance of a democratic republic."40 After all,
"[b]y the side of every religion is to be found a political opinion." 41
He referred to the Christianity of many British colonists as "a
democratic and republican religion" that has contracted with politics
to form "an alliance which has never been dissolved" in America.42
For Tocqueville, religion affected America both directly and
indirectly, "direct[ing] the customs of the community, and...
regulating domestic life." 43 He claimed that, "every principle of the
moral world is fixed and determinate, although the political world is
abandoned to the debates and the experiments of men."" That being
said, "[h]itherto no one in the U.S. has dared to advance the maxim
that everything is permissible for the interests of society.... Thus,
while the law permits the Americans to do what they please, religion
prevents them from conceiving, and forbids them to commit, what is
35. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 48 (Vintage Books
1957).
36. Id. at 55.
37. Id. at 233.
38. Id. at 255.
39. Id. at 310.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 311.





Traditional religion is both tangentially influential and
foundationally important for the American experiment. Although
"[r]eligion takes no direct part in the government of society ... it
must be regarded as the first of their political institutions."4 6
Tocqueville noted that the "religious aspect" of America had "great
political consequences," in that the spirits of religion and freedom
''were intimately united and reigned in common over the same
country." 47 Upon inquiring upon the origins of this phenomenon,
American religious leaders "attributed the peaceful dominion of
religion in their country mainly to the separation of church and
state."4 8 However, despite this separation, "in forming an alliance
with a political power, [traditional] religion augments its authority
over a few and forfeits the hope of reigning over all."49 Mysteriously,
the separation of Church and State actually seemed to increase the
power of religion within America."
Tocqueville also asserted that, "faith is the only permanent state
of mankind."' And this claim is manifest even in democratic nations,
for "[i]n proportion as a nation assumes a democratic condition of
society and as communities display democratic propensities, it
becomes more and more dangerous to connect religion with political
institutions."S2 This does not mean, of course, that Tocqueville found
no role for traditional religion to play in American society. He noted
that even unbelievers acknowledge religious institutions' "influence
upon manners and legislation."" Tocqueville's contribution to civil
religion cannot be overstated. His social commentary on early
America highlights how, even in a nation without a state-sponsored
45. Id. at 316.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 319.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 321. He goes on to say, "[a]s long as a religion rests only upon those
sentiments which are the consolation of all affliction, it may attract the affections of
all mankind. But . . . [tihe church cannot share the temporal power of the state
without being the object of a portion of that animosity which the latter excites." Id. at
321-22.
50. Id. at 320 ("[T]he real authority of religion was increased by a state of things
which diminished its apparent force.").
51. Id. at 321.
52. Id. at 322.
53. Id. at 324.
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traditional religion, a civil religion was able to direct and develop
moral behavior. Bellah chose Tocqueville's term "habits of the
heart,"" as the title of one of his books dealing, in part, with civil
religion, and it is to Bellah that we now turn.
C. Robert Bellah
Inspired by Tocqueville, Robert Bellah has devoted a good
portion of his scholarship to develop the concept of civil religion. As
an American scholar writing during a time of American turmoil, he
began in the 1960s to explore the notion of a public morality not
anchored to a traditional religious faith." In 1967, he was teaching
sociology at University of California at Berkeley, where student riots
and free love reigned in partial reaction to the Vietnam War.
Critical legal studies were beginning to take root, the hippie
generation was bucking against the establishment reins, and radical
feminism and Marxism were in their heyday. "God is Dead" was the
mantra of many young intellectuals. In short, society was fracturing
and Bellah, seeing these fractures, sought desperately to find an
unguent that could fill the fissures. Bellah turned to civil religion as
an appeal to American society, as a pleading for his community not to
discard core moral values even if it discarded traditional religious
motivations.
Bellah described civil religion as those "common elements of
religious orientation that the great majority of [citizens] share. . . .
[that have] played a crucial role in the development of [societal]
institutions and .. . [are] expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols, and
rituals . . .. This civil religion adopts the themes of many religions
and belief systems, clothes those beliefs in terminology that is not
exclusively theological, and then finds surrogate idols and Ur-texts to
give civil religion authority. Civil religion is separate from traditional
religious institutions, hovering between and above them." It is an
umbrella concept that will be construed in singular terms for this
paper.
54. See id. at 310.
55. See, e.g., Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 196 J. AM. ACAD. ARTS
& Sci. 1 (1967).
56. Hartford Institute for Religion Research, A Biography of Robert N. Bellah,
http://www.robertbellah.com/biography.html (last visited Nov. 2010).
57. Bellah, supra note 55, at 2.
58. Id. at 6-7.
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Domestically, the U.S. has one civil religion that evolves in
keeping with the prevailing zeitgeist.59 This civil religion applies to all
Americans, albeit in different ways and to different degrees.6 It
permeates a patriotic existence. The Pledge of Allegiance is our
creed, the Constitution is our scripture, and our founding fathers are
our patriarchs. We are devoted to democracy, we pray for our
progress, and we are committed capitalists. Our prisons are our civil
religion's purgatory, where we hope the criminal perpetrators prove
penitent. We celebrate our saintly soldiers on Memorial Day, and we
praise our political prophets such as Martin Luther King, Jr.
Nonetheless, civil religion is necessarily amorphous because there are
no official interpreters of it." It has no pope, no council of elders, and
no weekly service. Paradoxically, civil religion is the unified overtone
created from the harmony of conflicting American religio-political
mores that sometimes serves to legitimate our government's laws and
decisions and to make government more than a mere mechanism of
coercion.2 Civil religion is the apprehension of a universal truth,
inhabiting the dialectical space between church and state. After
Bellah further developed and defined the collaborative concept of
civil religion, Marty posited public theologies as the manner in which
individuals contribute to the communally shared concept of civil
religion.
D. Martin Marty
Marty's description of public theologies details how diverse
individuals contribute to a communal civil religion. Marty is an
emeritus professor at the University of Chicago. He has written
59. ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA:
FAITH, CULTURE, AND STRATEGIC CHOICES 63 (1st ed. 1995).
60. Granted, the assumption of a single civil religion is contentious. American
flag burners and military draft dodgers strain the idea of a single civil religion.
However, in the single civil religion view, those people may be viewed as people who
share the same religion but disagree on its implied behaviors. Or, they may be
viewed as civil religion's heretics. Civil religion is the majority viewpoint, but not the
uniformly accepted viewpoint.
61. Newscasters and political pundits might qualify as interpreters of civil
religion. However, they are only official insofar as their respective stations and
syndicates employ them. While some of these people have amassed substantial
followings, such followings are matters of taste rather than of official societal
endorsement.
62. See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, VARIETIES OF CIVIL
RELIGION 12-13 (1980).
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extensively on religion in modern American public life." Marty has a
long history with Bellah, and he anchors Bellah's version of civil
religion in American history.'
Supposing that there is indeed one civil religion in a given society
there are still various ways to understand and interpret that one civil
religion. These diverse understandings of the one civil religion are
called "public theologies." Marty defines a "public theology" as "an
effort to interpret the life of a people in the light of a transcendent
reference."" However, both domestically and internationally, we are
divided on how to "interpret" life, who constitutes the "people"
affected by those interpretations, and what exactly is referenced that
is "transcendent." Because of these ambiguities, it is more helpful to
speak of public theologies rather than of a public theology. Because
civil religion is a nebulous concept, public theologians abound, each
attempting to posit the attributes of their understanding of civil
religion. Individuals and groups assert their public theologies,
attempting to steer civil religion in particular directions. Certain
attributes of civil religion are ubiquitous, such as those propounded
supra by Rousseau. However, other attributes are more contentious,
and public theologians are divided as to how public theologies should
contribute to the communal perception of our civil religion.6
Today Americans accept as commonplace that our country does
not have an established religion. A sometimes porous wall of
separation exists between Church and State in this country. In the
wake of this separation as codified in the First Amendment,
Americans were left with a gap to be filled where religious
explanations once resided, providing the motivational impetus for
63. See, e.g., MARTIN E. MARTY & JONATHAN MOORE, POLITICS, RELIGION, AND
THE COMMON GOOD: ADVANCING A DISTINCTLY AMERICAN CONVERSATION ABOUT
RELIGION'S ROLE IN OUR SHARED LIFE (2000); see also 3 MARTIN E. MARTY,
MODERN AMERICAN RELIGION (1996).
64. See Martin E. Marty, On a Medial Moraine: Religious Dimensions of
American Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 9, 9-15 (1990).
65. MARTIN MARTY, THE PUBLIC CHURCH: MAINLINE-EVANGELICAL-CATHOLIC
16 (1981).
66. By way of a biology analogy, if civil religion is the genus, then public
theologies are the multiple species contained within that genus. By way of a
denominational analogy, if civil religion corresponds to Christianity, then public
theologies would include Presbyterians, Southern Baptists, United Methodists,
Roman Catholics, and so on. In more historical terms, the multitude of conflicting
public theologies - of different Jerusalems - are attempts by groups and individuals
to both describe and shape our one civil religion - our one Athens.
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moral action. Civil religion is a way to fill that gap. Without a state-
endorsed traditional religion to hold the community together, civil
religion has served as a substitute adhesive. Much like the literal
Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, this figurative American wall of
separation has engendered a great deal of debate. This wall of
separation is part of America's civil religion, although activists on all
sides of the multi-faceted wall disagree about how high and thick the
wall should be, as well as of what "materials" the wall ought to be
made. However, the widespread acceptance of this wall's existence
permits a degree of religious heterogeneity that was previously
impossible to achieve within one community. This wall, while
creating an environment for the "religious marketplace" to flourish,"
has also led to the proliferation of conflicting ideals on how we ought
to describe civil religion. Public theologians are waging culture wars
both domestically and abroad to determine whose theology should
prevail.
Humans tend to define ourselves via opposition, constructing our
identities as much by what we are not as by what we are. If a man
identifies himself as "Christian," he implies that he is "not
Hindu/Buddhist/Muslim/insert-other-religion-here." Likewise, by
identifying as a "capitalist," one implies that one is "not communist."
And yet few if any people are one-hundred-percent Christian or
Hindu, or one-hundred-percent capitalist or communist.' This binary
system of classification of "X" or "Not X" denies the existence of the
spectrum of possible public theologies existing between those two
poles.6 ' These "X" and "Not X" labeling terms may be familiar in a
folk sense, but they describe hypothetical states. 0 Nonetheless, public
theologians have caused such binaries to permeate our paradigms and
our power structures, our mentalities and our governments. By
67. See, e.g, FOWLER ET AL., supra note 59, at 15.
68. Even if a person maintains that he is one-hundred-percent X, how can he
defend his contention against others who disagree? Who is the arbiter that evaluates
the percentage to which a given person associates with a religion? Further, if X and
Y define Hassidic Judaism differently, but both claim to be devoted adherents, is
either right or wrong? By what standard can such a determination be made, and who
is the final authority on that determination?
69. See, e.g., JAMES HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA 160 (2000).
70. Likewise, to label concepts, theories, and ideals as either "religious" or
"political" creates a false - if not dangerous - binary. Granted, bifurcating religious
and political ideals can be useful to classify the belief systems of a community, but
such a binary can be harmful if thought of as actually extant.
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separating religious and political discourse, the U.S. has allowed
religious heterogeneity to flourish. But our nation's borders do not
circumscribe this trend towards religious diversity.7' Religious
pluralism is gaining traction in the international community, as
reflected by public international law, and Professor Harold Berman
did more than almost any other to translate the humanities
scholarship concerning civil religion into legal scholarship that has
had a bearing on international human rights instruments.
E. Harold Berman
Berman gave civil religion legal traction. A former professor at
Harvard University and Emory University and a pioneer in the field
of law and religion, he devoted a portion of his notable scholarship to
the concept of world law.72 According to Berman, public
international law plays a necessary role in establishing a coherent
world order. The U.N. serves as a de facto world government of
sorts, promulgating and maintaining this world order and playing a
role quite similar to that played by national governments for
individual nations.74 Berman's conception of this world order involves
not just positive law, but also "legal principles whose ultimate source
is universally shared conceptions of justice."" The treaties,
covenants, and conventions promulgated by the U.N. may indeed be
examples of positive law, in that they were drafted and adopted by
71. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, 1 3; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A, at art. 2, 18, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A1810
(Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; ICESCR, supra note 8, at art. 2, 2; ICCPR,
supra note 8, at art. 2, T 1, art. 18.
72. Berman, Harold J., The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First
Century: World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1617. Berman asserts that "world law"
is a more appropriate term for the modern interaction between nations than are the
terms "international law" or "transnational law," because "world law" encompasses
the modern trend of a greater degree of interaction and interdependence between
nations than do the other terms. See id.
73. HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND
RELIGION 281 (Scholars Press, 1993) ("Public international law is not only a
precondition of the world order; it is also part of a process of creating and re-creating
the world order.").
74. Id. at 282 ("If we view international treaties and conventions as a kind of
international legislation, and the U.N. as a kind of international executive and
administrative branch, and the International Court of Justice as an international
judiciary, then we may say that the world order that is developing at the end of the




U.N. representatives and delegates; but those positive legal
documents contain natural law principles based upon universally
shared concepts of justice."
Berman maintained that the U.N. documents - its human rights
documents in particular - stand for the proposition that "the entire
world, all mankind, despite its many diversities, not only shares some
common beliefs concerning human dignity but also has a common
concern to protect human dignity by a law that stands above the law
of individual states."" Berman called for broader conceptions of both
law and religion, such that those engaging in religio-political discourse
are capable of appreciating the dialectical relationship between the
two disciplines. Most legal systems, like most traditional religious
systems, are heavily ritualized, in that they rely on tradition and
appeal to the authority of something greater than the text of the
laws/scriptures themselves, and that legal and religious systems claim
moral universality within their jurisdictions. 79  "Thus sanctity is
attributed to law, and without sanctity law loses its force. Without
sanctity no coercion will be effective, since the agencies of coercion
will themselves be corrupted. That sanctity is the religious dimension
of law.""
While acknowledging the interaction between law and religion,
Berman recognized that the two disciplines are capable of both good
and evil." Nonetheless, he realized that law and religion both have
76. Id. (These documents "enact broad principles of liberty, equality, and
welfare, principles whose only meaning cannot be derived from the documents
themselves but only from the universally shared conceptions of justice that inform
the documents.").
77. Id. at 282-83.
78. Id. at 284 ("If we think of law only in positivist terms as a body of rules laid
down by political authorities and backed by coercive sanctions, we will not naturally
be led to connect the law of the world community with religion. . . . Yet law itself, in
all societies, encourages the belief in its own sanctity. It puts forward its claim to
obedience in ways that appeal not only to the material, impersonal, finite, rational
interests of the people who are asked to observe it but also to their faith in a truth, a
justice, that transcends social utility . . .. If, however, one defines religion in terms of
shared intuitions and convictions concerning the purpose and meaning of life, shared
emotions (as well as shared thoughts) concerning creation and redemption,
concerning transcendent values, concerning the nature and destiny of mankind-then
it is much harder to exclude legal relations, legal processes, and legal values from its
purview.").
79. See id. at 284-85.
80. Id. at 285.
81. Id. ("To say that religion is a source of world order is not to deny that it is
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roles to play in developing an effective world order.' This world law
would touch upon all aspects of communal life, from private
international trade to environmental concerns." But his advocacy for
a world order does not extend to promotion of an established world
religion." Rather, Berman's conception of a world order comports
with international civil religion, permitting traditional religious
diversity while retaining certain universal principles. These universal
principles can be maintained through an "interaction between
religion and international law in a multicultural, multireligious
world ... [such that] all great faiths ... may unite in affirming the
presence of a transcendent spiritual element - a holy spirit - in the
process of making, interpreting, and applying international law
itself."8 1
Many of these universal principles are embodied in the U.N.'s
human rights documents, and it is to those documents that we turn in
Section III. Rousseau's term of civil religion, as documented by
Tocqueville, as developed by Bellah and Marty, and as legally applied
by Berman, offers a helpful heuristic for understanding how diverse
religious worldviews can cooperatively coexist. The manner in which
they can collectively coexist is codified in the human rights documents
drafted and disseminated by the U.N. - the scriptures of international
civil religion.
III. International Instruments
The scholars considered above have done much to advance the
idea and ideal of national and international civil religion. But civil
religion is not limited to scholarship. The international human rights
documents promulgated by the U.N. constitute the codification of
international civil religion - they are international civil religion's
scriptures. That being said, the preceding statement must be qualified
also a source of world disorder.. .. Religion is not necessarily good. Law is not
necessarily good. World order is not necessarily good.").
82. Id.
83. BERMAN, supra note 72, at 1621.
84. Id. at 286 ("[A]n established world religion ... would be the worst possible
outcome. As between tyranny and anarchy, I prefer anarchy. Our one world is and
must remain a pluralist world . . .. It must also, however, be one world. E pluribus
unum. Both plural and one.").
85. Richard B. Bilder & Harold J. Berman, Book Review and Note, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 800, 803 (2000) (reviewing MARK J. JANIS & CAROLYN EVANS, RELIGION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999)).
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in two ways. First, these scriptures do not purport to be divinely
inspired. They are not proclaimed to be infallible.6 Rather, they are
seen as evolving achievements of democracy, resulting in part from
diplomatic bargaining.' Second, these scriptures are not designed to
supplant the existing scriptures of any traditional religion. As stated
supra,8 civil religion resides among and above traditional religions,
highlighting the complementary aspects shared between most
reasonable traditional religions while remaining silent about the
doctrinal and devotional particulars of any given religion.
Civil religion, as embodied in the documents considered in this
Section, is a way for global morality to flourish without dependence
on any particular traditional religion for sustenance. It is an allusion
to some moral fundamentals shared among traditional religions,
making compliance with the tenets of international civil religion more
than an attempt to avoid societal reprisal or to promote d6tente. As
the world has become "smaller" and more interconnected through
advances in technology, trade, and travel, national boundaries are
traversed more easily, and interfaith moral discourse is inevitable.
John Rawls noted "[t]he diversity of reasonable comprehensive
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern
democratic societies . . . is a permanent feature of the public
culture." 9 Global citizens have to determine how they want their
community to function, and public international law is the way
through which global citizens codify normative claims that convey
their consensus of right and wrong, good and bad.
Despite international variation with respect to religion, language,
geography, history, culture, race, political views, the number of
international agreements regarding trade, military support,
86. DAVID LITTLE. RELIGION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC REASON: THE ROLE
AND LIMITS OF THE SECULAR (forthcoming) (manuscript at 13, on file with the
author).
87. While human rights documents are the result of diplomatic legislation, they
are "understood to precede or predate all international covenants," existing
independently of their articulation on paper. Id. at 13. In this way, human rights
language - like civil religion - exists in the haze between the sacred and the secular,
the normative and the positive, the "ought" and the "is."
88. See Bellah, supra note 55, at 2, 6-7.
89. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 36; see also WITTE, supra note 4, at 457 ("Religion
has proved to be an ineradicable condition of human lives and communities -
however forcefully a society might seek to repress or deny its value or validity,
however cogently the academy might logically bracket it from its legal and political
calculus.").
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diplomacy, and human rights advancement has continued to
proliferate between nations in recent years.' In the absence of a
traditional religious explanation of why religiously diverse nations
negotiate to reach normative conclusions about the nature and
arrangement of temporal existence, international civil religion
provides a reason. The central tenet of international civil religion is
that every human is possessed of an inherent dignity.91 Just as many
traditional religions value human life as God's creation, the U.N.
chooses to extol the value of human life because individuals are
worthy of honor and respect as individuals.92
However, in the absence of an agreed upon supernatural
touchstone from which to discern moral truths, to what other
touchstone shall the global citizen turn? Political leaders from secular
states, religious monarchies, and religiously influenced nations
interact daily. In light of this diversity in our interconnected world,
how are international religio-political disputes to be resolved? What
bellwether is to guide our nations' leaders? How are state actors
supposed to promote and enforce moral behavior without appealing
to religious motivations?
Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asserted, "we
should blend realism with idealism, placing morality near the center
of our foreign policy even while we debate different understandings
of what morality means."93 This debate is the international culture
war being waged between public theologians regarding civil religion,
90. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 8; ICESCR, supra note 8; UDHR, supra note 71.
See also MADELINE ALBRIGHT, THE MIGHTY AND THE ALMIGHTY: REFLECTIONS ON
AMERICA, GOD AND WORLD AFFAIRS 87-88 (2006) ("Articulating moral principles is
what movements to establish international norms are in business to do. That is
precisely how military aggression, slavery, piracy, torture, religious persecution, and
racial discrimination have come to be outlawed. It is also how abuses against women,
including domestic violence, 'dowry murders,' 'honor crimes,' trafficking, and female
infanticide may one day be further reduced. This is a question not of imposing our
views on others, but of convincing enough people in enough places that we are right.
That is persuasion, not imposition.").
91. See ICCPR, supra note 8, at pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 8, at pmbl.; UDHR,
supra note 71, at pmbl. See also ALBRIGHT, supra note 90, at 289 ("Respect for the
rights and well-being of each individual is the place where religious faith and a
commitment to political liberty have their closest connection. A philosophy based on
this principle has the most potential to bring people from opposing viewpoints
together because it excludes no one and yet demands from everyone full
consideration of the ideas and needs of others.").
92. See ICCPR, supra note 8; ICESCR, supra note 8; UDHR, supra note 90.
93. See also ALBRIGHT, supra note 90, at 289.
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and it is being waged because civil religion can help address the
manifold moral concerns of religiously diverse nations. International
civil religion has identifiable texts, and it is capable of mediating
consensus among nations regarding its normative claims.
International civil religion has identifiable texts. If the
Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the various laws
of the U.S. are the "scriptures" of American civil religion, then the
U.N.'s human rights documents are the scriptures of international
civil religion. When the U.N. replaced the League of Nations at the
end of the Second World War, it was formed in the attempt to
prevent such horrific events from ever occurring again.94 "The
modern human rights movement was thus born out of desperation in
the aftermath of World War II. It was an earnest attempt to find a
world faith to fill a spiritual void ... to harvest ... the rudimentary
elements of a new faith and a new law that would unite a badly
broken world order."5 "Within a generation [of the formation of the
United Nations], human rights had become the 'new civic faith' of the
post-world order."96
The U.N. is presently the flagship of international organizations
of nations." At present, 194 nations are members of the U.N., each
with representation at the General Assembly. It is a secular
institution devoted, in part, to defending religio-political goods and
goals. The stated purposes of creating the U.N. include "to reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights," "to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war," and "to promote social progress."" Such
aspirational language is teeming with moral - if not religious -
presuppositions. To "save" succeeding generations from the
"scourge" of war assumes that war is a bad thing. To "promote social
progress" assumes that social progress is a good thing. Tacit in both
94. See, U.N. Charter, supra note 71, at pmbl. Against the background of the
Holocaust, "it is hardly surprising that the drafters [of the UDHR and subsequent
related documents] drew the conclusions they did about the indispensability of the
'constitutional essentials' - the set of rights, freedoms and public goods.. . ." LITTLE,
supra note 86, at 18.
95. WITrE, supra note 4, at 70.
96. Id. at 71.
97. While this assertion is controversial, no other international organization has
as geographically representative a membership or as much authority (at least
theoretically) to act on behalf of the international community of nations.
98. U.N. Charter, supra note 71, at pmbl.
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of these assumptions is that human life is valuable and worth living."
Civil religion promotes that social progress, because civil religion
stands for the proposition that we ought to have faith in human rights
because life is worth living and is worth living in particular ways."
Professor John Witte, Jr., Director of the Center for the Study of Law
and Religion at Emory University, described the twentieth century
developments in human rights as a "world revolution."'0' This
revolution, fought in midst of human rights atrocities being
perpetrated during the past several decades, "has helped to catalyze a
great awakening of religion around the globe."'02 "Religion has
become ... the latest 'transnational variable."1
03
It is no accident that a good number of the human rights
documents strive to ensure religious liberty as well.'" However,
"[h]uman rights principles are as much the problem as they are the
solution in a number of current religious and cultural conflicts."'o
This is why Witte claimed that "further rights talk alone is
insufficient ... human rights norms need a human rights culture to be
99. If war leads to death, and we want to prevent war, we want to prevent death.
Opting for life over death implies that life is superior to death in this scenario, and
thus implies that life is worth living. Likewise, "progress" is improvement, and social
progress thus improves a community. If we are advocating for social progress, we are
assuming that making communal life better is a good thing. These assumptions
implicitly posit normative claims and are religio-moral judgments about the value of
life.
100. See ICCPR, supra note 8, at pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 8, at pmbl.; UDHR,
supra note 71, at pmbl.
101. WITTE, supra note 4, at 63.
102. Id. at 64.
103. Id. (quoting SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH, TRANSNATIONAL RELIGION AND
FADING STATES 6 (Susanne Hoeber Rudolph & James Piscatori eds., 1997).
104. WITTE, supra note 4, at 64 (listing "liberty of conscience and freedom of
religious exercise, guarantees of religious pluralism, equality, and nondiscrimination"
on the individual and group levels.). See also, Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res.
36/55, U.N. Doc. AIRES/36/55 (Nov. 25, 1981)).
The advancements of religious liberty is in due in part to the fact that these newly
touted religious rights have led to a new "war for souls" in certain regions - "a
theological war" amongst "rival religious communities," leading to "religious
balkanization." WITTE, supra note 4, at 66. Thus, the development of religious
freedom has been countered in some countries by "new anti-proselytism laws, cult
registration requirements, tightened visa controls, and various other discriminatory
restrictions on newly arrived religions." WITTE, supra note 4, at 66-67.
105. WITE, supra note 4, at 67.
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effective."'" Witte claimed that we have moved from human rights
declaration to human rights implementation."o7 He averred that,
"religion and human rights need to be brought into a closer
symbiosis."'" Traditional religions and the human rights regime can
harmoniously coexist, and they need to be in dialogue.'" For,
"[h]uman rights are, in no small part, the modern political fruits of
ancient political beliefs and practices.",,o This dialogue is essential to
the success of the human rights regime taking root, for "[r]eligious
traditions cannot allow secular human rights norms to be imposed on
them from without; they must rediscover them from within.""1
However, Witte called for traditional religions to play a greater role
in the motivational impetus behind the human rights regime, whereas
this paper calls for that role to be played by a civil religion informed
by traditional religions. For the moral dictates of any traditional
religion bind only the adherents of that particular traditional religion,
whereas civil religion has the potential to knit those diverse dictates
together.
Witte is nonetheless correct that "human rights must have a
more prominent place in the theological discourse of modern
religions."" 2 After all, human rights are capable of providing a "new
global moral language"113 to help establish a civil religion without
having to usurp or replace traditional religion. Human rights
language has become "something of the lingua sacra of the modern
human rights movement."" 4  But unlike traditional religious
106. Id.
107. Id. at 68.
108. Id. After all, "these abstract human rights ideals ... depend on the visions
and values of human communities and institutions to give them content and
coherence." Id.
109. Id. ("Religious communities must reclaim their own voices within the secular
human rights dialogue, and reclaim the human rights voices within their own internal
religious dialogues.")
110. Id.
111. Id. at 69. To divorce tradition religion from human rights would cause four
problems: (1)"many rights are cut off from their roots;" (2) "the regime of human
rights becomes infinitely expandable;" (3) "human rights become too captive to
Western libertarian ideals;" (4) "the state is given an exaggerated role to play as the
guarantor of human rights." Id. at 72-73.
112. Id. at 74.
113. Johan D. Van der Vyver, Universality and Relativism of Human Rights:
American Relativism, 4 BuFF. HUM. RTS. L. R. 43, 44 (1998).
114. WrrrE, supra note 4, at 75.
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scriptures that have been codified and remain "static," the human
rights regime - while "presuppos[ing] the existence of fundamental
beliefs and values" - is a "relative system of ideals and values ... [that
is] fluid, elastic, and open to challenge and change."ns The human
rights regime is a "common law of nations" that is capable of adapting
itself as necessary to accentuate and accommodate the values
embedded within traditional religions."6 Such relativism can prove
beneficial. The human rights regime not only can, but also "must be
constantly challenged to improve. It should [also] be discarded ... on
cogent proof of a better global norm and practice.""
The U.N. Charter promulgated significant, if aspirational, goals
for itself and its members, including the promotion of peace and the
establishment of just international laws."" From 1945 forward, the
U.N. has drafted and promulgated documents that have been ratified
by an increasing number of countries."9 The subject matter covered
by some of these documents has been referred to as "generational
rights," with the first generation dealing with civil and political
rights,20 the second generation dealing with economic, social, and
cultural rights,12' and the third generation moving beyond the human
realm towards environmental issues. The preambles to both the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
"[recognize] that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the
human person."12 2 Those preambles each go on to "[realize] that the
individual having duties to other individuals and to the community to
which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion
and observance of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant[s]."l 2' Each of these covenants proceeds to then enumerate
and expound upon particular rights and protections that are due to
every human from every other human precisely because the actors
115. Id.
116. Id. at 76. That being said, the human rights regime is not completely open to
relativism, but are "a relatively stable set of ideals by which a person and community
might be guided and judged." Id. at 76-77.
117. Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
118. U.N. Charter, supra note 71, at pmbl.
119. See ICCPR, supra note 8; ICESCR, supra note 8; UDHR, supra note 71.
120. See ICCPR, supra note 8.
121. See ICESCR, supra note 8.
122. ICCPR, supra note 8, at pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 8, at pmbl.




Because the covenants were designed to be signed and ratified by
nations, those nations are deemed to be the parties agreeing to ensure
that the protections of the covenants are duly enforced and made
available to their respective citizens.124 In the ICCPR, such
protections include the right to life and freedom of person, religion,
speech, assembly, and association.125 In the ICESCR, such protections
include the right to work, to social security, to adequate living
standards, to physical and mental health, and to education.26 Each of
these protections further supposes that humans are worthy of
protecting, and that these protections are somehow beneficial or
valuable to individual humans.
For example, the ICCPR includes the prohibition of "[a]ny
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence."127 Such a
prohibition disallows religiously motivated persecution and warfare
waged in the name of any traditional religion. The ICESCR includes
"the right of everyone to education ... [that] shall strengthen the
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms ... [and] shall
enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all ...
religious groups."128 Such a right is designed to ensure that diverse
religious communities can live together harmoniously in a global
community. Both of these examples constitute tenets of international
civil religion.
The rights and prohibitions contained within the ICCPR and
ICESCR are not meant to limit the ability of individuals, groups, or
nations to act consistently with their traditional religious beliefs.
Rather, the only limitations imposed are those that would trample the
moral dictates of international civil religion. As stated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the
124. ICCPR, supra note 8, at pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 8, at pmbl. ("Considering
the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms.").
125. ICCPR, supra note 8, at arts. 6, 18, 19, 21, and 22.
126. ICESCR, supra note 8, at arts. 6, 9, 11, 12, and 13.
127. ICCPR, supra note 8, at art. 20, 2.
128. ICESCR, supra note 8, at art. 13, 1.
2011] 109
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society.
The passage above exhibits the notion that civil religion is only
minimally restrictive, permitting maximal freedom for all while
prohibiting only the exercise of actions that stifle the freedom of
others or hinder the spirit of cooperation."'o
It is remarkable that so many nations can come to consensus
about these particular moral issues without necessarily agreeing on
any particular religious worldview. International civil religion
mediates this consensus among nations regarding the normative
claims embodied in these documents. If civil religion is thought to
reward virtue and punish vice, then civil religion must take a stance
on what constitutes virtue and vice. These require moral judgments.
Civil religion attempts to discern a uniform set of absolutes from the
conflicting ideals of varied public theologies. It "provides meaning, a
grounding for values in a culture."131
While the U.N. does not identify itself as an arbiter of
international civil religion, it advances the ends of international civil
religion. The assent of so many nations to the U.N.'s covenants,
conventions, and protocols supports the contention that the subject
matter of these documents - be it religious liberty issues, the right to
self determination, or the acquiescence to nonviolent means of
dispute resolution - have moral appeal that transcends many religious
worldviews while fitting within them. Further, jus cogens norms
suggest that moral imperatives exist which the majority of global
citizens are capable of endorsing while still maintaining their
traditional religious beliefs.132
129. UDHR, supra note 71, at art. 29, $ 2.
130. As stated by Karl Vasak, the UDHR can be thought of as a "modern edition
of the New Testament, and the Magna Carta of humanity" and is capable of
providing "a constant source of inspiration for governments." A 30-Year Struggle:
The Sustained Efforts to Give Force of Law to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. UNESCO COURIER. Nov. 1977, at, 29, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.
org/images/0007/000748/074816eo.pdf.
131. FOWLER ET AL., supra note 59, at 247.
132. Granted, U.N. terminology replaces moral language with rights language.
However, this substitution of religiously nuanced language with doctrinally neutral
rights language widens the circle in which the global citizens wishing to create
universal normative propositions can converse. This linguistic substitution allows for
the conversants to communicate with unbiased terminology that has not had
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As detailed supra in Section II.C., multiple public theologies
exist, each attempting to describe and direct the definition of civil
religion. Individual public theologies prove of varying value, but each
public theology can participate in the civil religion conversation. The
following Section details one possible public theology - a public
theology that this author maintains is a helpful perspective from
which to approach international civil religion. The following public
theology builds upon the theories of several prominent public
theologians, distilling the beneficial components of each of the
scholars' theories, and combining them to offer the maximum
possible benefit for the maximum number of people by allowing the
widest possible discretion for traditional religious practice while
sustaining commitment to the ideals of a cooperative civil religion.
IV. A Proposed International Public Theology
Much like international civil religion is one perspective from
which to regard international religio-political relations, the following
public theology is one way to appreciate international civil religion.
Public theologies are lenses through which to discern civil religion.
Many of these lenses are equally plausible, but what follows is one
particular lens that gives appropriate deference to traditional religion
while insisting upon respect for other traditional religions.
International public theologians can be divided into two groups. On
the level of international policy, a nation's diplomats serve as
practical public theologians working towards social justice. Each
nation sends delegates to the General Assembly of the U.N., and
those delegates intercede as their nations' clerics to advance their
countries' interests in the evolving definition of international civil
religion.
On the level of moral theory, scholars are public theologians, and
these scholars distill the components of a worldview that supports the
principles of international civil religion.m' The following Subsection
centuries of culturally specific shellac glazed upon it. The U.N has played a key role
in brokering such agreement with respect to religio-political issues. In that sense, the
U.N. is furthering the concept of international civil religion by pursuing religio-
political goals without invoking traditional religious rhetoric or motivations.
133. Dividing international public theologians into diplomats and scholars is
another example of a binary classification, and such binaries were criticized above.
See supra note 70. However, this binary classification is meant to be merely
demonstrative rather than to contain any limiting substantive import that would
prevent international public theologians from simultaneously playing both roles, or
1112011]
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details how one international public theology could address the
concerns of religious pluralism. 13 4 The following international public
theology blends John Rawls's theory of political liberalism, as
adopted/adapted by Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach, and
finally overlaid with cosmopolitanism as explained by Kwame
Appiah. The reasons for choosing this complex arrangement are
partly chronological and partly to maximize the number of potential
participants in this conversation. In terms of chronology, Rawls's
corpus of relevant scholarship came first, followed by Nussbaum, then
Appiah. In terms of maximizing inclusivity, Rawls declared his
theory of political liberalism to be applicable within one society
rather than between or among various societies. Nussbaum's
capabilities approach used many of the tenets of political liberalism,
but then applies them to relations between societies. Appiah's
version of cosmopolitanism couched moral ideals similar to the
preceding two theories without relying as heavily on distinctively
Western notions of morality. This public theology crafted from a
conglomerate of moral theories allows the moral ideals expressed in
political liberalism and the capabilities approach to flourish, while
acknowledging that other non-Western perspectives might
accommodate the same or similar moral ideals just as well. This
paper stands for the proposition that by choosing the best attributes
of these theories, and by combining their complementary components
in a synergistic fashion, a public international theology emerges that
advances important moral ideals while maintaining an appreciation
for religious diversity.
A. Political Liberalism
John Rawls was a Harvard University professor specializing in
moral and political philosophy. In wrestling with the task of
brokering a collective agreement on the ethical underpinnings of
society, John Rawls posited the concept of political liberalism.
Although political liberalism relies on moral concepts, Rawls's goal is
to advance a political ideology rather than a moral one."' He
distinguished political liberalism from any particular religious
that would deny the existence of various other roles.
134. The categorization of the theorists below as "international public
theologians" is my own description, and I am not implying that the scholars would
self-identify as international public theologians.
135. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 2, at 9.
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worldview, offering political liberalism as an epistemology in which
an overlapping consensus of moral worldviews can coexist in
harmony.'36 Within this Venn diagram arrangement, justice as
fairness is paramount,"' with justice providing a foundation upon
which the scaffolding of political liberalism can be erected. Rawls's
scaffolding is capable of supporting and accommodating the vast
majority of religious epistemologies the vast majority of the time.
Consequently, Rawls's theory provides a fertile soil for the human
rights regime.
Several of today's prominent moral scholars have addressed the
relationship between human rights and religious value. Among them
is Professor David Little of Harvard Divinity School,' who
highlighted a "consistent, if carefully circumscribed, rationale on the
part of the drafters [of the UDHR] for deliberately excluding all
confessional or religious references. . . ."139 Little maintained that it is
heuristically useful to understand human rights language in terms of
Rawls' notion of public reason. '4 Such a public reason "provides a
common, religiously neutral language" capable of existing above
religious beliefs, and that "is conceived of as freestanding by being
independent of any comprehensive religious or other doctrine."141
Little proceeded to note five characteristics of human rights
language. First, human rights language presupposes the "ideal of
democratic citizenship."142  Second, this language "is designed to
136. Id. at 24.
137. Id. at 9 ("Justice as fairness tries to do this by using a fundamental organizing
idea within which all ideas and principles can be systematically connected and
related. This organizing idea is that of society as a fair system of social cooperation
between free and equal persons viewed as fully cooperating members of society over
a complete life.").
138. See also NICHOLAS WOLTERSDORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS (2007);
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR ENQUIRIES (1998); David
Novak, Religious Human Rights in Judaic Texts, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES 175-201 (1996); Abdullahi An-
Na'im, Toward an Islamic Hermeneutics for Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
RELIGIOUS VALUES: AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP? (1995).
139. LITrLE, supra note 86, at 4.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 5 ("Officially, it neither authorizes nor is authorized by any religious
position, yet it espouses a notion of 'reasonable pluralism' and a commitment to
tolerance of diverse religious and other convictions so long as adherents to those
convictions agree to live in accord with the constitutional essentials presupposed by
the idea of public reason." (internal citations omitted).).
142. Id. at 7.
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provide guidance in [the] face [of] a large array of divergent and
competing comprehensive views."' Third, human rights norms help
to achieve a Rawlsian overlapping consensus so that the goods
protected by the state are bolstered by numerous traditional religious
systems.'" Fourth, human rights language is of a legal nature, thus
lending itself to judicial interpretation.145  And fifth, human rights
language is aspirational.""
Despite the legal nature of human rights language, the human
rights regime is a moral regime. Rawls noted that when moral
philosophy began, "ancient religion was a civic religion of public
social practice, of civic festivals and public celebrations . . .. As long
as one participated in the expected way and recognized the
proprieties, the details of what one believed were not of great
importance." 147  This original moral philosophy bears parallels to
Rousseau's and Bellah's ideas of civil religion.148 For instance, this
original moral philosophy was "always the exercise of free, disciplined
reason alone," neither based on traditional religions nor religious
ideas of divine revelation. 149  However, the modern world is not
composed of ancient, geographically isolated city-states in which one
traditional religion can thrive in each governed community.
Nowadays, only through the "oppressive use of state power" could
one traditional religion continue to hold societal endorsement.'
Thus, Rawls asked how a just society can remain stable in light of
reasonable religious pluralism."' He proffered justice as fairness'52 -
143. Id. at 8. Human rights are thus secular in the sense that they are "assumed to
be held in common by all citizens [and do] not depend directly on any religious of
other comprehensive view." Id. However they are not secular insofar as they are
bolstered by numerous religious traditions. See n. 146 infra.
144. Id. at 9. See also General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion (Art. 18), July 30, 1993, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, General
Comment No. 22.
145. LITrLE, supra note 86, at 11 ("[H]uman rights language constitutes 'outer
limits' on matters of conscientious belief by authorizing the legal inhibition of actions
deduced from particular theological or philosophical comprehensive doctrines that in
practice violate the human rights code. . . .
146. Id.
147. RAWLS, supra note 2, at xxi. Rawls notes that this original moral philosophy
began around the time of Socrates. Id.
148. See supra Section II.A., II.C.
149. RAWLS, supra note 2, at xxii.
150. Id. at 37.
151. Id. at 4.
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his idea of political liberalism in which an overlapping consensus of
reasonable religious worldviews can peacefully coexist while still
fulfilling the basic needs"' of each individual citizen. Political
liberalism offers a political conception of the good that can be
endorsed by believers of various traditional religions, because it exists
independently of any particular religious doctrine.
This political liberalism allows for play in the joints. After all,
citizens adhering to any reasonable traditional religious worldview
can peacefully coexist within a Rawlsian society while still freely
"pursu[ing] their (permissible) conceptions of the good.""' Political
liberalism provides a frame upon and within which traditional
religions can build, but without some semblance of which a pluralistic
society is likely to quarrel over moral issues. It promotes social
cooperation without requiring social unity on all issues. Political
liberalism provides society a cornerstone without specifying which
architectural style society must choose. It provides a metaphorical
village in which each reasonable religious worldview may erect its
own house of worship.
However, political liberalism does have limitations, and it is
subject to criticism as a Western perspective. Rawls's theory requires
a democratic society in order to function."' Further, political
152. Id. at 5-6. Rawls's conception of justice as fairness rests on two foundational
principles: (1) "Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal
rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in
this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed
their fair value;" and (2) "Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two
conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices of fair equality and
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit to the least advantaged
members of society." Id.
153. Id. at 180-81. Rawls avers that basic needs are met by ensuring that each
citizen is given access to basic rights and liberties, which he refers to as "primary
goods," which consist of: (1) "basic rights and liberties"; (2) "freedom of movement
and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities"; (3)
"powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility in the political and
economic institutions of the basic structure"; (4) "income and wealth"; and (5)
"social bases of self-respect." Id. An analysis of the differences between Rawls's
primary goods and Nussbaum's central capabilities (see n.175, infra) is beyond the
scope of this paper.
154. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 9-10.
155. Id. at 74.
156. See, e.g., id. at 90. However, note that democratic regimes and constitutional
guarantees are not universally endorsed presumptions necessary to establish a
functional society. See, e.g., NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH. BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL:
PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE 72 (Walter Kaufman trans., Vintage
2011] 115
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
liberalism cannot accommodate all aspects of those religious
worldviews that unequivocally advocate exclusive soteriological
claims."' Also, the ideals of political liberalism cannot be achieved
overnight. Such a paradigm shift takes time, particularly for those
who do not share Rawls's appreciation for democracy.
Notwithstanding such criticisms, Rawls hoped that "[g]radually, as the
success of political cooperation continues, citizens [will] gain
increasing trust and confidence in one another."' 8 If Rawls's hopes
come to fruition, society would eventually become a "social union of
social unions," in which diversity can flourish.'" This Rawlsian union
of unions is precisely what civil religion strives for - endorsing
cooperation within, between, and among social unions (religious
"'unions" in particular) to create an overarching union to which all
traditional religions can belong.'60 Nussbaum took this social union of
social unions to the next level, broadening the former of those two
unions to international proportions.
B. Political Liberalism Adapted to the Capabilities Approach
While Rawls limited his analysis of political liberalism to a single
society or nation rather than applying it to the relationship between
and among societies or nations,"' Nussbaum widened her analysis to
include international relations via her capabilities approach. 62 She
claimed that the goal of her version of the capabilities approach is:
To provide the philosophical underpinning for an account of basic
constitutional principles that should be respected and implemented
Books 1989) (1886) ("To love man for God's sake - that so far has been the noblest
and most remote feeling attained among men . . . The philosopher as we understand
him, we free spirits . . . will make use of religions for his project of cultivation and
education, just as he will make use of whatever political and economic states are at
hand.").
157. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 152.
158. Id. at 168.
159. Id. at 323.
160. To invite all religions to belong does not mean that all religions will accept
the invitation. As Rawls noted, his theory only accommodates "reasonable"
diversity. See supra note 153. Unreasonable religions are likely to refuse the
invitation. RAWLS,supra note 2, at 272.
161. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 272.
162. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 5 (2000). Her presumption that citizens indeed have the
capabilities to become human beings worthy of human dignity bears a striking
resemblance to Rawls's presumption that people have the capacity to be reasonable
citizens in a social union of social unions. See, RAWLS, supra note 2, at 19.
116 [Vol. 34:1
International Civil Religion
by the governments of all nations, as a bare minimum of what
respect for human dignity requires ... the best approach to this
idea of a basic social minimum is provided by an approach that
focuses on human capabilities, that is, what people are actually able
to do and to be - in a way informed by an intuitive idea of a life
that is worthy of the dignity of the human being."'
Her capabilities approach bears a resemblance to Rawls's
overlapping consensus in that it chooses political goals without
attempting to ground them in the metaphysical motivations of
traditional religions, thus attempting to make her approach a
universally endorsable proposition.'" Like Rawls, she acknowledged
that this paradigm shift from the religious to the political is no easy
feat.'6  After all, religion has historically been a "central locus of the
moral education of the young ... [and] a central vehicle of cultural
continuity. "'6 However, she went on to contend that historical
resilience of traditional religions does not equate with their
metaphysical veracity.1'6 The possibility that a better paradigm exists
is exactly why the endeavor to discern an international civil religion is
worthwhile.
Nussbaum claimed that her capabilities approach allows for
citizens to expect certain minimums of treatment from their
government6'" because each "individual person should be the focus of
political thought." 169 By positing each person as an end in herself, she
hoped that her approach would be able to "make normative
recommendations that cross the boundaries of culture, nation,
religion, race, and class."o70 However, in her attempt to find morals
that transcend religious pluralism, Nussbaum did not advocate moral
relativism.'
163. NuSSBAUM, supra note 162, at 5.
164. Id. at 5-6.
165. Id. at 179-80.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 254.
168. Id. at 12.
169. Id. at 55.
170. Id. at 34.
171. Nussbaum notes, "normative relativism is self-subverting: for, in asking us to
defer to local norms, it asks us to defer to norms that in most cases are strongly
nonrelativistic. Most local traditions take themselves to be absolutely, not relatively,
true. So in asking us to follow the local, relativism asks us not to follow relativism."
Id. at 49.
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The central question of her capabilities approach is, "What is a
person actually able to do and to be?" 172 For each person to reach her
full potential, Nussbaum's ideal society must promote the central
capabilities."3 Each individual must have the option to exercise these
capabilities, because that option is what separates humans from other
life forms.174  Like Rawls, Nussbaum wants the consideration of
human equality to transcend religious pluralism.17 ' However, unlike
Rawls, Nussbaum applies her capabilities approach to the
international realm, hoping such an approach will prove useful for
both governmental and international institutions, and using nations as
her measurable units."' She advocates a view of humanity that she
hopes will engender "broad cross-cultural resonance and intuitive
power."' 7 After all, "even a highly moralized globalism needs nation
states at its core, because transnational structures (at least all the ones
we know about so far) are insufficiently accountable to citizens and
insufficiently representative of them."978
Nonetheless, despite Nussbaum's adaptation of Rawls's political
liberalism and her expansion of the capabilities approach to the
international sphere, her theory suffers from some of the same
shortcomings. For example, like Rawls, she presupposed democratic
regimes.17 ' Further, like Rawls's primary goods, Nussbaum's
capabilities seem to address first- and second-generation rights,"'o but
not the rights of subsequent generations. Thus, without further
application, both theories do not sufficiently account for the
172. Id. at 71.
173. Nussbaum's central capabilities are life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses,
imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play;
and control over one's environment (both politically and materially). Id. at 78-80.
This list of central capabilities has some notable differences from Rawls's list of
primary goods. See id. at 15 n.50.
174. Id. at 71-72.
175. Id. at 85-86.
176. Id. at 70. Nussbaum further notes that her approach was influential for the
U.N.'s Development Program's Human Development Reports from at least 1993
through 1997.
177. Id. at 72.
178. Id. at 105. See also id. at 75 n.73 ("I also envisage a role for international
agencies and international human rights law in implementing theses basic
capabilities; but on grounds of accountability, the nation state remains the basic
unit.").
179. See id. at 52,70-71 (use of rights language and constitutional guarantees).




progressive nature of the U.N.'s aspirational development of later
generations of rights. The theories of Rawls and Nussbaum provide a
floor of protections for humans, but they do not contemplate walls or
ceilings above that floor. 81 Nonetheless, Rawls and Nussbaum both
provided nutrient rich fodder for the development of a helpful public
theology.
Both Rawls and Nussbaum are American authors, writing in an
American context, and influenced by American ideals. Appiah is of
African origin and brings an African heritage to bear on the
development of international civil religion. Appiah's
cosmopolitanism thus augments the appeal of international civil
religion, in part, by adding an international perspective to what has
thus far been a theory of primarily Western design.
C. Political Liberalism Adapted to the Capabilities Approach with
an Overlay of Cosmopolitanism
The less-Western perspective of cosmopolitanism can
complement the Western-influenced theories of Rawls and
Nussbaum. Cosmopolitanism stands for the proposition of
"universality plus difference."1n According to Kwame Appiah, a
cosmopolitan is a citizen not just of a particular locality, city, or
country, but is rather a citizen of the cosmos more generally.m A
cosmopolitan must: (1) recognize obligations to others exceeding
those due solely to kith, kin, and fellow citizens; and (2) maintain a
significant appreciation of the value of human life, of particular
human lives, and of "the practices and beliefs that lend them
significance."" This simple, two-pronged philosophical mindset
allows for a flourishing of co-existing moralities on a global scale,
while putting minimal constraints on the content of any individual
morality.'
181. See, e.g., id. at 75 (averring that the central capabilities give "us the basis for
determining a decent social minimum in a variety of areas.").
182. Appiah, supra note 4, at 151.
183. Id. at xiv.
184. Id. at xv.
185. See id. at xvi ("Some contemporary philosophers have similarly urged that
the boundaries of nations are morally irrelevant - accidents of history with no rightful
claim on our conscience."); see also id. at xix ("[Cosmopolitanism] begins with the
simple idea that in the human community, as in national communities, we need to
develop habits of coexistence: conversation in its older meaning, of living together,
association.").
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Cosmopolitanism is a modest philosophy advancing the idea of
"fallibilism - the sense that our knowledge is imperfect, provisional,
subject to revision in the face of new evidence."8 A cosmopolitan
believes that international and cross-cultural dialogue is not only
possible,"' but also beneficial.'" A cosmopolitan strives to sustain a
belief in some absolutes while maintaining a humble skepticism of the
precise parameters of those absolutes.'89 While respecting a pluralistic
people's variegated visceral sentiments of right and wrong, the
cosmopolitan remains open to dialogue because "it is often much
clearer to us what we should do than why. "1
The cosmopolitan acknowledges the significance of human
passion and its variety, because he realizes that hostility will likely
follow if he fails to acknowledge the passionate variety.'1 In matters
of importance coupled with uncertainty, the human instinct is to seek
definite answers, then to posit those answers as authoritatively true.19
Thus, "[t]he temptation is to look for a rule book that could tell you
how to arbitrate [religio-moral] conflicts.... [B]ut then you'd have to
agree on the rule book. And even if you did ... there's no reason to
186. Id. at 144.
187. See id. at 57 ("Cosmopolitans suppose that all cultures have enough overlap
in their vocabulary to begin a conversation. But they don't suppose, like some
universalists, that we could all come to agreement if only we had the same
vocabulary.").
188. See id. at 104 ("Cosmopolitans think human variety matters because people
are entitled to shape their lives in partnership with others.").
189. See id. at 144 ("Cosmopolitans believe in universal truth, too, though we are
less certain that we have it all already. It is not skepticism about the very idea of
truth that guides us; it is realism about how hard the truth is to find.").
190. Id. at 63. Robert Schapiro, in writing about the "widespread agreement" to
the UDHR, quoted Jacques Maritain as saying that, "yes, we agree about the rights
but on the condition that no one asks us why." Robert A. Schapiro, The
Consequences of Human Rights Fundamentalism, 54 EMORY L.J. 171, 175 (2005)
(internal citations omitted). Schapiro goes on to state, "The diverse participants in
drafting the Universal Declaration could not have agreed on ultimate philosophical
foundations. Indeed, Maritain's remarks suggest that the attempt to find consensus
on underlying principles might have impeded agreement on the rights themselves.
Participants may have been less likely to agree to rights that were asserted to rest on
foundations they found foreign. Thus, consensus could be reached on the rights
themselves, but not on grounding principles. The participants agreed to agree on
what they could agree and not to be distracted by areas of disagreement." Id.
191. See APPIAH, supra note 3, at xx ("Conversations across boundaries can be
fraught, all the more so as the world grows smaller and the stakes grow larger.").
192. For example, some religious groups appeal to divinely inspired scriptures to
attest the veracity of their metaphysical claims.
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think you'd be able to agree on its application."193 Moral values, after
all, require a community to exist.194
Humans inevitably view moral issues through the lens of their
own meta-narrative, failing to separate theory from data.19' Thus,
unlike empirical science, it is not possible to broker complete global
agreement on almost any moral issue. 96 For even if a community can
agree that a particular moral value is worthwhile, contention remains
regarding how best to achieve that value in a particular situation." In
a given situation, reasonable people can disagree about how to best
further a particular value because: (1) "we can fail to share a
vocabulary of evaluation"; (2) "we can give the same vocabulary
different interpretations"; and (3) "we can give the same values
different weights."19
Regardless, a difference of values need not prevent multiple
parties from reaching agreement on particular moral situations.
"[W]e can agree about what to do even when we don't agree why."19
For the goal is not to create a uniform traditional religion to which
every person in the world must adhere. Rather, "our political
coexistence, as subjects or citizens, depends on being able to agree
about practices while disagreeing about their justification."2m The
only prerequisite value that must be shared for cosmopolitanism to
193. APPIAH, supra note 3, at 11.
194. Id. at 28 ("We go astray ... when we think of a moral vocabulary as the
possession of a solitary individual .. . The concept of kindness, or cruelty, enshrines a
kind of social consensus . . . The language of values is, after all, language. And ...
language is, first and foremost, a public thing, something we share. Like all
vocabulary, evaluative language is primarily a tool we use to talk to one another, not
an instrument for talking to ourselves.").
195. Id. at 41 ("If what's reasonable to believe depends on what you believe
already, however, then you can't check the reasonableness of all your beliefs.").
196. "[T]he methods of the natural sciences have not led to the kind of progress in
our understandings of values that they have led to in our grasp of the facts." Id. at 43.
The inability to broker complete agreement need not deter us, however, from
pursuing an overlapping consensus. See id. at 139.
197. Id. at 58-59 ("[M]ost terms for virtues and vices .. . are what philosophers call
'open-textured': two people who both know what they mean can reasonably disagree
about whether they apply in a particular case." These terms are "essentially
contestable.").
198. Id. at 66.
199. Id. at 67. "If my interest is in discouraging theft, I needn't worry that one
person might refrain from theft because she believes in the Golden Rule; another
because of her conception of personal integrity; a third because she thinks God
frowns on it." Id. at 69.
200. Id. at 70.
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flourish is the value of living in community." 201
Appiah asserted that, "there are some values that are, and should
be, universal, just as there are lots of values that are, and must be,
local."20 Therefore, the cosmopolitan pragmatically acknowledges
the inevitability of interaction across national and religious
boundaries, while not attempting to require a single rulebook from
which each community must draw in dealing with every possible
moral issue.203  The indigenous habits and beliefs of individual
communities are worthy of respect, much like individual people are
worthy of respect. Yet respect for these cultures does not require
assimilation to those cultures, for one "can be genuinely engaged with
the ways of other societies without approving, let alone adopting,
them."204
Even without attempting to impose a one-size-fits-all value
system on the global population, any consensus brokering will still be
a gradual process, because people need time to adapt to change. 205 By
attempting to pass a new human rights law in the international realm,
''we are seeking to change the world of law in every nation on the
planet," and that is no easy feat.2" But we can begin this gradual
process now. After all, what is the value of talking or writing about a
distant and aspirational state of affairs? "[W]e should learn about
people in other places, take an interest in their civilizations, their
arguments, their errors, their achievements, not because that will
bring us to agreement, but because it will help us get used to one
another." 20 7 For "[c]onversation doesn't have to lead to consensus
about anything, especially not values; it's enough that it helps people
get used to one another.,208
201. Id. at 78 ("[W]e can live in harmony without agreeing on underlying values
(except, perhaps, the cosmopolitan value of living together).").
202. Id. at xx.
203. See supra quotation accompanying note 3; see also WITTE, supra note 4, at
112 ("Religion is an ineradicable condition of human lives and human communities..
. . Religion will inevitably figure in legal and political life . . .. Religion must be dealt
with because it exists - perennially, profoundly, pervasively.").
204. APPIAH, supra note 3, at 8.
205. Id. at 73: "[W]hen it comes to change, what moves people is often not an
argument from a principle, not a long discussion about values, but just a gradually
acquired new way of doing things." See also id. at 77 (Appiah goes on to talk about
the power of habit).
206. Id. at 82.
207. Id. at 78.
208. Id. at 85.
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Like the preceding two theories, cosmopolitanism standing alone
falls short of being a universally endorsable proposition. It requires
the same presupposition that underlie political liberalism and the
capabilities approaches: "[E]very human has obligations to every
other. Everybody matters: that is our central idea. And it sharply
limits the scope of our tolerance."2" Thus, some justification is
required in order to harm anyone else,210 because "we have
obligations to strangers." 21  And yet despite the presuppositions of
cosmopolitanism, it is well suited for implementation within the U.N.
human rights regime because it relies on the precept that "the
primary mechanism for ensuring these entitlements [moral principles]
remains the nation-state." 212 Moreover, cosmopolitanism is a helpful
contribution to this public theology because it can be used to express
the sentiments of Rawls and Nussbaum in less Western terms, thus
giving international civil religion wider cross-cultural appeal.
Aspects of these three theories - Rawlsian political liberalism,
Nussbaum's capabilities approach, and Appiah's cosmopolitanism -
fuse to create a public theology that is both workable and adaptable.
This particular public theology need not be the public theology, but it
is merely one of many to offer an alternative moral worldview that
seeks to accommodate the vast majority of moral perspectives
without relying on any particular traditional religious reasoning. The
foregoing public theology is valuable because it is based on
chronologically and culturally diverse perspectives. It preserves
individual faiths to the maximum degree, circumscribing them only to
the extent necessary to prevent the exercise of one individual faith
from unduly infringing the exercise of another. It solicits cooperation
while maintaining respect for individuality. It honors tradition and
heritage while acknowledging community and promoting peace.
V. Concluding Reflections
International civil religion is a helpful lens through which to view
diplomatic relations. The public theology advanced above is an
appropriate understanding of international civil religion. It respects
religious diversity, presupposing a plurality of religious faiths and
209. Id. at 144.
210. Id. at 151.
211. Id. at 153.
212. Id. at 163.
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presuming a global society. It offers all reasonable individuals and
groups the opportunity to remain devout and independent while
coexisting harmoniously with other reasonable individuals and groups
whose beliefs differ. It acknowledges the inevitability of global
interaction, fosters global cooperation, and preserves global diversity.
Although Bellah did not deem an international civil religion
possible when he began writing about national civil religion over forty
years ago,213 he has lately modified his theory.214 Whether called
international civil religion, global civil religion,215 or world law,216 these
concepts all seek a "viable and coherent world order."217 As we
progress further into the twenty-first century, Bellah has become
apprehensive about "America's place in the world, and indeed the
kind of world it would have a place in." 218 Religious resources are
necessary for the "membership in global civil society," because
"religious motivation is a necessary factor .. . to transform the
growing moral consensus and the significant beginnings of world law
into an effective form of global solidarity and global governance." 219
Nowadays, when the traditional religion of a given community
cannot serve as the benchmark against which the moral uprightness of
a citizen's action is measured abroad, we have recourse to
international civil religion as a guide. The concept of international
civil religion is valuable because in our global society, we need
something beyond fear of societal reprisal to undergird our diverse
normative claims.
International civil religion, as described by Rousseau,
Tocqueville, Bellah, Marty, and Berman; as manifest by U.N.
documents detailing the human rights regime; and as philosophically
bolstered by theories such as political liberalism, the capabilities
approach, and cosmopolitanism; advances just such a moral
213. Robert N. Bellah, Can We Imagine a Global Civil Religion, THE CENTER FOR
THE STUDY OF LAW AND RELIGION (Oct. 26, 2007), http://cslr.law.emory.edu/
publications/publication/title/can-we-imagine-a-global-civil-religion/ ("[I]n 1967 . . .
the flickering flame of the United Nations burns too low to be the focus of a cult, but
the emergence of a genuine transnational sovereignty would certainly change this ...
no, a global civil religion is not possible.").
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See Berman, supra note 72, at 1617.





foundation. No longer can businessmen and statesmen keep each
other in check by appealing to the threat of divine retribution if their
counterparts violate an agreement. No longer can a political leader
impose his religion on every person with whom he negotiates. No
longer should treason be equated with apostasy, nor should the
heretic be criminally liable for his religious trespass.
Zooming out a frame, civil religion is just one possible lens
through which to view the ongoing struggle to find international
moral norms; it is one meta-narrative among many.220 Civil religion
serves as a floor in the global moral community. It does so by
positing minimal standards on which the vast majority of us can agree.
These standards are usually procedural rather than substantive, in
that they guarantee a process by and a framework in which decisions
can be made, but the standards do not necessarily determine the
decisions themselves.221 International civil religion permits the variety
of indigenous heritages, races, traditions, and faiths spread
throughout the world to continue knitting their cultural quilts, while
identifying the common threads woven through them. International
civil religion posits aspirations couched in rights-based language.
Admittedly, civil religion may be a heuristic rather than a
metaphysical reality. The fact that most people agree on certain
baselines of acceptable behavior may not vest those baselines with
any transcendent significance. But, in keeping with the sentiments of
Thomas Jefferson, there very well may be "an innate moral sentiment
that [impels people] toward benevolence."222 The tasks of civil
religion are to identify that "moral sentiment," to describe why and
how it is "innate," and to determine what constitutes "benevolence."
220. Maybe the last thing we need is yet another meta-narrative to replace the
manifold meta-narratives embodied by so many already extant traditional religions.
History has proven time and again that meta-narratives have been used as
justifications to perpetrate all manners of atrocity. But that criticism of international
civil religion can just as easily be a justification for the necessity of just such a meta-
narrative. If it is granted that meta-narratives are historically pervasive - if not
inevitable - then the simplest option is to alter the meta-narrative rather than
attempt to debunk a type of epistemology that has pervaded virtually every society
since immemorial.
221. For example, the UDHR calls nations to give all individuals "the right to life,
liberty, and the security of person," but it does not instruct nations of what those
terms mean or of how nations should give those rights to their citizens. UDHR,
supra note 71, art. 3.
222. BELLAH ET AL., supra note 1, at 46 (quoting Thomas Jefferson) (internal
citations omitted).
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Despite the daunting contrasts of so many worldviews worldwide, our
global social union of social unions continues to wage culture wars
regarding civil religion because we value the answers or hypotheses to
the big-picture questions that our public theologies represent.
Work remains to be done. At present, civil religion has been
developed primarily as a Western notion. Granted, many of the
moral scholars above have helped to expand the purview of civil
religion to the international realm, but the fact remains that all of the
theories above presuppose democratic societies and rational actors
capable of unyoking their religious faiths from certain aspects of their
political worldviews. Civil religion cannot accommodate every
person or belief system; even though it tries to transcend traditional
religions, some religious adherents will refuse to compromise or alter
their views in a spirit of collaboration. For people whose unshakable
theological perspective does not include a belief in the substantial
value of individual human beings, civil religion has little to offer.
However, as shown by the widespread acceptance of the
aforementioned U.N. documents, the tenets of civil religion are
gaining credence in the international community.
Future scholarship needs to express the tenets of civil religion by
appealing to more than Western ideals. Just as the U.N. used rights-
based language instead of the religiously nuanced language of
American civil religion, so must international civil religion find a soil
in which its axioms - whether Rawlsian primary goods, Nussbaum's
capabilities, Appiah's fallibilism, or some similar theory - can thrive
without depending on democracy and Western thinking as requisite
nutrients of that soil. The further contributions of Eastern, Middle
Eastern, and African scholars to international civil religion could
prove invaluable. As moral scholars continue to develop the
philosophical grounding of civil religion, and as diplomats continue to
amplify the quantity of rights and quality of life within and among
nations, the international community will continue to reap the
benefits of civil religion by reaching agreement on moral matters that
are near and dear to each of us.
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